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216 [420.2d 
[Crim. No. 5421. ID BaDk. I'e1t. 18, 1954.) 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, 'Y. GEORGE H. ASHLEY, 
Appellant. 
[1] False PreteDa-DtstfDpIahecl !'rom La.rce.D7 ~ 1frict an4 
Device.-Larceny by trick and devioe is appropriation of prop-
erty the possession of which w.. fraudulentlJ acquired, 
wbereaa obtaining property by false pretenses is fraudulent 
or deceitful aequisition of both title and possession. 
[i] La.rcenJ'-Ueet of StatuteDelniq 'rheft-Elements Un-
changed.-Althougb oifenses of lareeny by trick and device and 
obtaining property by false pretenses, with other larcenous 
mimes, have been consolidated into single crime of theft (Pen. 
Code, 1484), their elements have not been changed. 
(3] Id.-Purpose and Ejfeet of Statute De1lD1q 'rhef\-Parpose 
of consolidation of the several larcenous crimes into single 
mime of theft (Pen. Code, 1484) was to remove technicalities 
that existed in pleading and proof of these mimea at common 
law; indictments and informations eharging "theft" oan now 
.unply allege an "1Ullawful taking" (Pen. Code, 11951, 952), 
and juries need no longer be concerned with technical di1fer-
ences between several types of theft but can return a general 
verdict of guilty if they find that an "1Ullawful taking" has 
been proved. . 
[4] ld.-meet of Statute Delniq 'rhef~E1ements uJlCh&Dp(L-
Judgment of conviction of theft based on general verdict of 
guilty oan be sustained only it evidence discloses elements of 
one of eonsolidated ojfensee. 
[5] False Pretenses - Elements. -Where evidence in prosecu-
tion for grand theft shows that each prosecuting witness in-
tended to pass both title and possession of money and property 
[1] Bee Oat..Tur., False Pretenses, 113: Am..Tur.,False Pretensee, 
13· 
MeE. D1c. Befereneea: [1] False Pretenses, 12; [2-4] Larceny, 
13; [6] False Pretenses, 13; [6] False Pretenses, 169; [7,9] False 
Pretenses, 16; [8] False Pretenses, 116; [10, 26, 27] False Pre-
tenses, 140; [11] FraUd, § 12; [12, 18] False Pretenses, 11; [13, 
22,23] False Pretenses, 137(1); [14, 15, 191 False Pretenses, 114; 
(16] False Pretenses, 1114, 42; [17] Conspiracy, 15; False Pre-
tenses, 11; [20] Criminal Law, 1658; [21] False Pretenses, 141; 
[24) False Pretenses, §37(5); [25] False Pretenses, § 47; [28-30] 
Witnesses, § 19; [31] Criminal Law, § 968: [32] Criminal Law, 
§ 969; [33J Criminal Law, § 970(6); [34J Criminal Law, 1106; 
[35] Criminal Law, § 105; [36] False Pretenses, § 19; [37} Criminal 
Law, 11459; [38] Criminal Law, 1264; [39] Criminal Law. 1611. 
~) 
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to person to whom she delivered possession, type of theft, if 
aDY, was that of obtaining property by false pretenses. 
IS] Id.-Appea1-Harm,le81 Error -hstructions.-Although evi-
ace in prosecution . for graud theft shows that type of 
theft, if aDY, was that of obtainiDg property by false pre-
teDSeS, defendaDt wu not prejudiced by aD instruction relat-
inIs to lareeuy by trick aDd device where he requested instruc-
tions relating to both lareeDy by trick and device aDd obtaining 
property by false pretenses, and where hia defense wu not 
based on distinctions betweeu title and possession but on eon-
~ntion that there was no unlawful tamg of aDy sort. 
[7] Id.-Elements-Representation 01' Pretense.-To support • 
conviction of dleft for obtaining property by false pretenses, 
it must be shown that defendant made a false pretense or 
represeutation with intent to defraud owner of his property, 
.oDd that owner was in fact defrauded. 
[8] Id. - Elementa - 'banafer.-In prosecution for graud theft 
based on obtaining property by false pretenses, it is unneces-
18!')' to prove that defendaDt beueflted personally from fraudu-
!ent acquisition. 
. [9] 1d.-EIements-Representation or Pretense.-While false pre-
tense or representation must have materially influenced owner 
to ilart with hia property, it need not be sole inducing cause. 
[10] Id.-Eridenc&-Proof of Pretense-Oorroboration.-If con-
viction rests primarily on testimony of single witness that 
false pretense W38 made, the makiDg of such pretense must be 
., eorroborated. (Pen. Code, § 1l10.) 
-, [11] Fraud-Promise Kade With htent not to Perform.-False 
; promises CaD provide foundation of a civil action for deceit 
'; (Civ. coae, §§ 1512, subd. (4), lnO, subd. (4), but in It-.1ch 
., actions something more tban nonperformance is required to 
prove defendaDt's intent not to perform his I'Tomise. 
". [12] False PreteJUel - EIementa - R8presentatioll or Pretense-
. Promi8e.-Proof of nonperformance alone is insufIlcient ill 
~'. eriminal prosecutions based on false promisee. 
[18] Id.-Evidence.-In criminal prosecutions based on false prom-
_!~. iaee the People must prove their ease beyond • reaaonable 
'" doubt . . ,. ~ . 
. [14] Id.-Blementa-htent.-The problem of proving intent when 
-, false pretense is .. false promise is no more diftlcult thaD when 
,. false pretense ia misrepresentation of existing fact. 
~ [16] 1d.-EIements-htent and Enowledge.-In eases of obtaining 
property by false pretenses, it must be proved that any mis-
/ 
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representations of fact alleged by the People were made 
knowingly and with intent to deceive. 
[16] ld.-Elements-Intent: Instructions.-Whether pretense is a 
false promise or is a misrepresentation of fact, defendant's in-
tent must be proved by something more than mere proof of 
nonperformance or actual falsity, and defendant is entitled to 
have jury instructed to that effect. 
[17] OonspiracJ'-OrimiDal-Particular Conspiracies: False Pre-
tenaes-Representation-Promise.-Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 4, 
relating to conspiracies to obtain money or property "by false 
pretenses or by false promises," does not indicate that Legis-
lature did not regard falstl promises as "false pretenses" 
within meaning of Pen. Code, §§ 484, 532, defining crime of 
obtaining property by false pretenses, but merely indicates 
that such words were probably added out of abundance of 
lIaution to insure carrying out of legislative purpose to include 
all such aets within scope of § 182; omission of comma af~r 
"false pretenses," as quoted above, also indicates that Legis-
lature did not set either "false pretenses" or "false promises" 
apart from the other as a separate class of crime but regarded 
them as same kind of crime. 
[18] False Pretenses >~ Elements - Representation or Pretense 
-Promise.-IncluSion of false promises within Pen. Code, 
55 484, 532, defining crime of obtaining. property by false pre-
tenses, will not materially encumber business a1Iairs. 
[19] ld.-Elements-Intent.-Ordinary commercial defaults can-
40t be subject of criminal prosecution, for essence of obtain-
ing property by false pretenses is fraudulent intent of de-
fendant. 
[20] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Weight of Testi-
mony.-It is for jury to sift true from false, to determine 
credibility of witnesses and weight to be given testimony of 
an individual witness, even if it is inconsistent. 
[21] False Pretenses-Questions of Law and Fact.-Where n-
year-old prosecuting witness in prosecution for theft by false 
pretenses testifled that defendant told her that "they" owned 
certain property, that loan was made directly to defendant, 
that corporation which defendant represented "was not brought 
into this at all," and that she relied on his representation of 
ownership of property, these matters were for jury to consider 
in determining weight to be given her testimony, it being pos-
sible that pronouns were interchanged owing to knowledge 
later acquired, a slip of the tongne, or to fact that defendant 
and corporatioD had become ODe in her mind. 
[22] ld.-Evidence.-The fact that prosecuting witness in prosecu-
tion for theft by false pretenses refused to admit her signature 
to letter acknowledging receipt of note and t.ruat deed ..... 
(, 
to., 
) 
) 
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immaterial to main issue and went merely to her credibility 
as a witness where this !etter was not written by her, and 
where she refused to acknowledge letter or her signature be-
cause letter stated that she had received a note prior to one 
whose receipt was acknowledged in letter. 
(23] Id.-Evidence.-Testimony in prosecution for theft by false 
pretenses that prosecuting witness was frightened when de-
fendant took gun from drawer and placed it on top of desk 
did not prove that crime was extortion rather than theft, 
wh.,re money had previou,;ly been advanced to defendant in 
reliance on his false representations, and gun episode accom-
plished no more than an exchange of promissory notes, giving 
an outward appolarance of regularity to transection whereby 
money was previously acquired. 
[24] Id.-Evidence.-An implied finding that money had been 
acquired with felonious intent is sustained by evidence that 
defendant, f\S head of an organization, deliberately set out to 
acquire life savings of his victims, one a woman nearing 70 
and the other a woman of little education and rural back-
ground, that women were won over by 1lattering offers of posi-
tions in organization and false promises of security for their 
10SJlb, and thereafter held in line by importunate and then 
menacing supplications. 
(25] Id.-Appeal-~uestions of Law and Fact.-In prosecution 
for theft by false pretenses, it is duty of reviewing court to 
examine evidence to determine whether corroboration required 
by statute (Pen. Code, § 1110) has been presented; the weight 
of such evidence is for jury. 
[26] Id.-Evidence - Proof of Pretense - Corroboration.-Testi-
mony of prosecuting witness in prosecution for theft by false 
pretenses that she' had been promised a first mortgage on cer-
.,a,in property is corroborated, among other things, by evidence 
~at she was given a second trust deed on property, the giving 
of such trust deed being indicative of a prior promise to give 
.. ecurity. 
[27J Id.-Evidence-Proof of Pretense-Corroboratton.-The fact 
that defendant has made same or similar representation to 
another, although at a diiIerent time and place, is a corroborat-
ing circumstance, in prosecution for obtaining property by 
false pretenses, and testimony of one prosecuting witness may 
be corroborated by that of another, where similar representa-
tions were made to each. 
'[28] Witnesses-Duty to Testify-Hect of Failure to Testify.-
A defendant's failure to take the stand to deny or explain evi-
dence presented against him, when it is in his power to do so, 
may be considered by jury as tending to indicate truth of such 
evidence, and as indicating that among inferences that may 
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reasonably be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to defendant 
are more probable. 
[29] Id.-DutJ to Testify-Effect of Failure to Testify.-Defend-
ant's failure to testify will not supply a lacuna in prosecu-
tion's proof. 
[80] Id.-DutJ to Testify-Effect of Failure to Testify.-In crim-
inal cases, after prosecution haa made a prima facie case, 
defendant's failure to testify is not affirmative evidence of any 
fact, and any inference that can in the circumstances be justly 
drawn therefrom is persuasive rather than probative, lending 
weight to evidence presented by prosecu~on. 
[81] Oriminal Law-New Tr1aJ-Time of Bearin, aDd Oontinu-
ances.-Where three continuances of hearing on motion for 
new trial were granted at request of defendant's counsel and 
hearing was then set for designated date on de1inite under-
standing that motron was then to be heard and decided, on 
which day counsel argued motion at length and aBnounced 
that other parts of motion were in process of preparation by 
defendant who needed time to secure signatures to affidavits, 
it was proper to grant a continuance on condition that there 
would be no further oral argument. 
[32] Id.-New Trial--Bearing-Argument.-If trial court mis-
conceives or refuses to do its duty with reference to a motion 
for a new trial and denies reasonable opportunity for oral 
argument, a new trial must be granted: but where trial judge, 
despite remarks indicating impatience. carefully read and 
considered affidl'vits presented and called for originals of 
documents mentioned therein. and where affidavits ftled by 
defendant were in effeet oral argument presented in written 
form, a fair and impartial bearin,:t on motion waa had. 
[33] Id.-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.-It was not an 
abuse of discretion to deny a motion for new trial on ground 
of newly discovered evidence where the documents presented 
as newly discovered evidence were either manufactured and 
signature thereon procured by stratagem or were cumulative, 
denied by cODnteraffida'l"its. and came from unreliable sources. 
[34] Id. - Rights \)f Accused - Oonfrontation by Witnesses-
Waiver.-The right of defendant to be confronted by witnesses 
at his trial may be waived. 
[36] Id.-&ights of Accused-Oonfrontation by Witnesses.-Tbe 
right of defendant to be confronted by witnesses is preserved 
to him in adva.ltage he once had of seeing witness face-to-face 
and of subjecting him to ordeal of cross-examination, and 
defendant is not deprived of such right, where he had that 
[34J See Oal.Jur., Criminal Law, §§ 76, 77; Am.Jur., Criminal 
Law, 1188. 
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advantage at preliminary hearing, by the reading of witness' 
testimony as given at preliminary hearing. 
[36] False Pretenses-Separate Crimes.-Where proof in a given 
ease is sufficient to show existence of fraudulent intent or pur-
pose on part of accused to obtain property from another by 
false or fraudulent representations, the making of ftrst false 
representations which moved or induced person to whom they 
were made to part with his property does not immunize de-
frauding person from punishment for subsequently obtain-
dlg from such person other property which was parted with 
under influence of fraudulent representations which were still 
operating on mind of defrauded person at time he passed his 
Droperty into hands of such designing person. 
[37J Criminal Law-Successive Crimes.-A conviction of eon-
spiraC!y to use the mails to defraud is a prior conviction within 
our statutes (Pen. Code, §§ 969b, 3024, subd. (c», and fact 
that minimum term of sentence is thereby increased does not 
render the law unconstitutional. 
[38] Id.-Trial-Conduct of Trial.-It is not only the right but the 
duty o~ trial judg-e so to supervise and regulate course of trial 
that truth shall be revealed so far as it may be. within estab-
lished rules of evidence. 
(89J Id.-Argument of Counsel.-District attorney was not guilty 
of misconduct in his argument to jury in prosecution for 
theft by false pretenses when he said that prosecuting witness 
waf "robbed" ot security of her second trust deed at a later t time, where jury was aware that no charge to that effect was 
"j involved and that quoted word was used in colloquial rather i than legal sense, and where jury was properly cautioned. 
t' APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
:William B. Neeley. Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for grand theft. Judgment of conviction af-
firmed. 
;' George H. A!;hley. in pro. per., Wallace E. Wolfe. Jr .• 
under appointment b~' the Supreme Court, and Benjamin D. 
~Brown. for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
" TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was convicted of four counts of 
ITand theft under section 484 of the Penal Code. He c, appeals 
m the verdicts and judgments as to each count," and 
...... ·dss,.;nc his motion kr a ......... 
, 
I 
) 
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The first two counts charged that defendant feloniously 
took $13,590 from Mrs. Maude Nealon June 19, 1948, and 
$4,470 from her on August 3, 1948. The remaining two 
counts charged that he feloniously took $3,000 from Mrs. 
Mattie Russ on November 19, 1948, and $4,200 from her on 
December 4, 1948. 
Defendant was the "business manager" of "Life's Estate, 
Ltd., " a corporation chartered for the purpose of •• intro-
ducing people." Although defendant did run, and had full 
authority to run the affairs of tJ.e corporation, its capital 
stock was owned by Mrs. Edith Wingrave, defendant's sister-
in-law, and Mr. and Mrs. Leo Butts, defendant's son-in-law 
and daughter. Mrs. Wing rave and the Buttses were also the 
officers and directors of the corporation. . 
In the latter part of 1948 Mrs. Russ, then about 70 years 
of age, visited the offices of Life's Estate at 1537 North 
La Brea Avenue in Hollywood. She was introduced to de-
fendant, who persuaded her to join the "Life's Estate Philo-
sophical Society. U On November 18, 1948, in response to a 
telegraphic invitation, she returned to the La Brea offices and 
was offered a position as matron and hostess at a salary of 
$100 a month with a rent-free apartment on the property. 
She accepted the offer. As defendant was driving Mrs. 
Russ to her home in Long Beach, he went by a lot on Sunset 
Boulevard on which stood two sheet metal buildings. De. 
fendant told her that •• he owned that property and they also 
owned the La Brea property at 1537." As they drove on, de-
fendant asked Mrs. Russ if she had any ready cash. When she 
told him that she had $3.000 he explained that he was building 
a theater on the Sunset property and needed money to pro-
ceed with the construction. He offered her interest at the 
rate of 6 per cent and security in the form of a first mortgage 
or trust deed on the La Brea property. Mrs. Russ agreed to 
make the loan and to go with defendant to her bank the fol-
lowing morning. When they arrived at the bank, defendant 
refused to go in with Mrs. Russ. She entered alone and 
secured $3,000 in currency from a safe deposit box. De-
fendant then took her in his automobile to a bank in West-
chester, a suburb of Los Angeles. On arrival at this bank 
she turned the money over to defendant in reliance on his 
representations that she would get a first mortgage on the 
La Brea property and that the money would be used in the 
construction of a theater on the Sunset Boulenrd lot, which 
she believed he owned. Defendant gave her a receipt for the 
Feb. 1954] PEOPLlll tI. AsHLEY 
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money, which stated that she was to receive a first trust deed 
on the La Brea property. The money was deposited to the 
account of Life's Estate at the Westchester Branch of the 
Security-First National Bank. The corporation's books show 
that on that day the cash account was subject to an overdraft 
of $4,151.93. 
After this transaction was completed, defendant took Mrs. 
Russ to the offices of Life's Estates and later to dinner. At 
dinner he told her that he needed more money to complete 
the theater building and asked her to make an additional loan. 
She said that she had a note, secured by a trust deed and 
a chattel mortgage, worth $4,200 that she had acquired from 
the sale of the home in which she had previously lived. She 
agreed to transfer these documents to defendant. This loan 
and the previous one of $3,000 were to be consolidated, and 
he agreed to give her a first mortgage for the full amount 
against the La Brea property. On November 20, 1948, 
, defendant drove Mrs. Russ once again to her bank, which 
held the documents and acted as her agent for the collection 
of installments. Again defendant insisted that she enter 
-, the bank alone. After securing the documents, Mrs. Russ 
suggested that they return to the bank and have the bank's 
employees prepare the transfer, but defendant insisted that 
the necessary papers could be prepared in his office. The 
transfer was made that day. It was stipulated that the note 
secured by the trust deed and chattel mortgage was sold by 
defendant and the proceeds of the sale deposited to the ac-
count of Life's Estate. They were used for the operating 
expenses of the corporation. 
On November 25, 1948, Mrs. Russ moved into an apart-
ment at the La Brea property and undertook the duties of 
matron and hostess. She testified that her many requests 
for the promised first mortgage were unavailing and that she 
returned to defendant her receipt for the $3,000, when he 
; told her that she would receive the mortgage if she did 80. 
After frequent quarrels over the failure to deliver the 
mortgage and over the tasks assigned her, Mrs. Russ left the 
employ of Life's Estate on March 31, 1949. At this time she 
received a note of the corporation secured by a second trust 
deed on unimproved property in Nichols Canyon owned by 
the corporation. Mrs. Russ testified that, although this 
. aecurity was worthless to her, she took it because defendant 
. bad tokl her to "take that or noth.ina." 
t; 
/ 
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It was proved that the Sunset property was owned by the 
corporation and that no theater was ever built thereon. The 
La Brea property was owned by Dr. Louis Phillips. who 
had leased the property to Mrs. Wingrave for a period of five 
years. He had not authorized anyone to place an encumbrance 
On this property. 
Mrs. Russ testified that she did not receive a note prior 
to the one accompanying the second deed of trust on the 
Nichols Canyon property. When shown a letter, signed by 
her. acknowledging receipt of the note and second deed of 
trust and agreeing to cancel and return a prior note, she reo 
fused to admit that the signature was hers, because of the 
reference to the prior note. It was stipulated that the signa· 
ture was genuine. 
Thereafter. Mrs. Russ made a number of smaller loans to 
defendant. Sh(' testified that the loans were made in respoI!se 
to appeals that they were necessary to maintain public utility 
service and the like. All of these loans were repaid. In 
payment of the loans of $3.000 and $4.200 Mrs. Russ received 
four postdated checks drawn by Life's Estate. After it had 
become clear that these checks would not be paid. defendant 
drov(' Mrs. Russ to a high point in Nichols Canyon and asked 
for an extension of time Mrs. Russ was frightened by their 
proximity to the edge of a steep embankment. Earl Farns· 
worth. an employee of Life's Estate. met them on the road as 
defendant had instructed him to do. He testified that he de· 
livered an envelope to defendant. who opened it and gave 
Mrs. Russ the contents. a promissory note payable six months 
from date. She finally agreed to an extension but said that 
she wanted the time shortened. After pleading that he 
couldn't raise the money in any shorter length of time. de· 
fendant finally agreed to change the term of the note from 
six to four months. He made the change. (rave the note to 
Mrs. Russ and told Farnsworth to return and pick up his 
remains. Mrs. Russ testified that she consented to thE' ex· 
tE'nsion because she w&..<; fri(rhtened by defendant's drivin!Z <;0 
near to the edge of a sheer slope and by his threats to take 
his own life so that she might be paid from the procE'eds 
of his life insurance policies. 
In support of the two counts charging defendant with 
(rrand theft from Mrs. MaudE' NE'al the People introduced 
the testimony of Mrs. Neal at the preliminary hearing", sinee 
she had returned to her North Carolina home and was not 
available at the time of the triaL 
) 
:) 
r 
g. 
t,·. F::95;~ beeam~=':"::;:~ Estate throng:": 
, newspaper advertisement and Leo Butta called to seU her 
r. a membership. She later went to the La Brea oftice, where 
Mrs. Wingrave introduced her to defendant. After lOme 
preliminary conversation be asked her if she owned any 
· property. She replied that she owned $17,500 worth of war 
bonda. Be learned that the bonds were kept in • lock-box in 
· Mrs. Neal's home in North Carolina. Defendant then intro-
duced Mrs. Neal to Dr. IDy8Be8 Meyer. a psychologist associated 
with Life's Estate. After some further talk. Mrs. Neal signed 
• note for $40 and became a member. 
Between March and June of 1948. defendant and Mrs. 
Neal had a number of conversations regarding her money. 
· . She was offered a position as matron and bostess with aD 
· apartment rent-free if she would let him have aU her money. 
,'. Be stated that he wanted ber money to take up an option 
that he had to buy the El Patio Theater for $165.000. which 
he said was worth $500.000. Defendant said that be would 
, give Mrs. Neal a note of Life's Estate and a trust deed on the 
theater building. She was unable to decide whether to make 
the loan. but offered to have ber bopds ttlailed to ber, De-
. fendant insisted that this method was too slow and prevailed 
· upon her to telepbone ber daughter to send the bonds by 
'airmail. After receiving the bonds. Mrs. Neal went to the 
office of Life's Estate and talked to defendant. When she 
reintroduced the subject of security, be flew into a rage. say-
ing that she talked as though she did not trust him. She 
'eaUed on Dr. Meyer. told him of the conversation. and then 
left with ber bonds. At 10 o'clock that night. Leo Butta 
'ulled for her and she went with him to the offices at La Brea, 
'where she met defendant. Be said that Dr. Meyer had told 
liim that she was afraid to let them have her money, and 
'that be was lOrry if be had given ber the impression that 
~ey were not honest. Be again told her that she would have 
'iood security for her loan beCJluse the corporation was ....orth 
• half-million dollars and bad $125,000 worth of equipment 
m the building alone. After lOme further conversation she 
:agreed to make a loan. 
o On the next day, June 19, 1948, defendant ealled for Mn. 
~'Neal and drove her to the Inglewood Branch of the Security-
::first National Bank. Some of the bonds were not redeemable 
• a bank, 80 Mrs. Neal obtained only $13,590 at this time. 
purehaaed a eashier'. check for the &moot, endoned it 
/ 
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and gave it to defendant, who endorsed it and deposited it 
to the account of Life's Estate on the same day. Mr. Nelson 
of the Security-First National Bank testified that he had a 
conversation with defendant and Mrs. Neal at this time, and 
they told him that the money was needed to make a down 
payment on the EI Patio Theater. Mrs. Neal was then taken 
to a bank in Westchester, to which she moved her bank ac-
count at defendant's request. The remaining bonds were 
turned over to this bank to be forwarded to the Department 
of the Treasury for redemption. Mrs. Neal testified that she 
had never agreed to lend the money that was to be realized 
from these bonds. 
Mrs. Neal received a note from Life's Estate for $13,500, 
but did not receive the deed of trust. An escrow for the 
purchase by Life's Estate of the EI Patio Theater was opened 
at the Westchester Branch of the Security-First N",tional 
Bank with a deposit of $5,000 on June 23, 1948. The escrow 
was closed and the deposit was withdrawn on July 13, 1948. 
Defendant'8 attorney testified that the purchase was can-
celled by agreement, after defendant had unsuccessfully at-
tempted to secure a reduction in the purchase price, because 
the motion picture projection booth would have to be re-
modelled to conform to fire regulations, and because of en-
croachments and easements that would be exempted from the 
policy of title insurance. . 
Mrs. Neal testified that, so far as she knew, the purehase 
had taken place when she went to the La Brea office of Life's 
Estate on August 3, 1948. There she found a check for 
$4,470, naming her as payee, which had been sent to the 
La Brea address in payment for the bonds transmitted through 
the Westchester bank. Mrs. Neal endorsed the check, but 
did not take possession of it. It was subsequently deposited 
to the account of Life's Estate. After waiting until the 
offices were empty, defendant said that he wished to speak to 
her in his office. He offered her a new note for $17,500, but 
she said that she did not want to give him the rest of her 
money because she might need' it to buy a car or to make a 
down payment on a home. After she had refused an offer 
of a car as a token of appreciation, defendant took Ii gun from 
a drawer, placed it on the desk, and said, "Now look here, 
Mrs. Neal. I don't want no monkey business out of you. Do 
you understand thatf" Frightened by defendant's demeanor 
and the presence of the gun, Mrs. Neal picked up the new 
note ad returned the $13,500 note. 
-) 
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,', . Sometime after the events just related, defendant told Mrs. 
i Neal that the theater building had been condemned and that 
the deal had fallen through. The record also discloses that 
Mrs. Neal consulted an attorney, but no action W88 taken. 
;. She had received only $649.49 in interest on her loans at the 
time of trial. 
Witnesses for the defense presented a completel1 ditterent 
'Version of the facts. Leo Butts testified that each of the 
. women had voluntarily offered to make unsecured loans to 
corporation. The offers were made to the corporation'. 
vw.CC;~lII, who accepted them. It was stipulated that Mrs. Butts 
testify similarly. There was also testimony that Mrs. 
must have known that the La Brea property W88 owned 
Dr. Phillips, that Mrs. Neal had advised cancellation of 
EI Patio purchase in the early part of July and had re-
an offer to return her money. and that she had been 80 
to lend the proceeds from her bonds that she called 
Butts to take her to the office at 9 :30 p. m., whereupon 
. took her there, and the transaction was completed in his 
There is little evidence concerning the financial standing 
the corporation or defendant's participation in the profits. 
incorporation took place in DeCember of 1947, when 
were only 100 members. Capital stock of a face value 
$25,000 was issued, but the corporation did not receive all 
this amount in cash. Extensive improvements on the leased 
property were paid for by the corporation. Leo Butts 
IJeStiJlled that the membership had increased to approximately 
at the time the loans were made, but that only UO was 
for each membership, an insufticient amount in view 
high expenses. Thereafter the fees were raised to a 
[aximu:m of $100. Butts also testified that the corporation 
not aflord to pay defendant a salary, and that he 
"his business knowledge to our small organization." 
admitted, however. that defendant drove a Lincoln 
[Q,tomolblle bought by the corporation. and had received and 
nu:merous checks for expenses. The fact that the 
!i!Stda1~ checks given to Mrs. Russ in payment of one of 
loans eould not be met, and that the l()ans of both Mrs. 
and Mrs. Neal were used to meet overdrafts or for the 
operating expenses of the corporation, indicates that 
corporation was havin~ finaneiRl c1iflicnlties. 
case went to the jury with instructions relatiDa to 
/ 
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larceny by trick and device and obtaining property by false 
pretenses. The jurors were instructed that all would have 
to agree on the type of theft, if any, that was committed. De. 
fendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support 
a conviction of either type of theft, that the general verdict 
of guilty was unlawful, and that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a new trial on these grounds. 
[1] Although the crimes of larceny by trick and device 
and obtaining property by false pretenses are much alike, 
they are aimed at different criminal acquisitive techniques. 
Larceny by trick and device is the appropriation of property, 
the possession of which was fraudulently acquired; obtaining 
property by false pretenses is the fraudulent or deceitful 
acquisition of both title and possession. (See PeopZB v. Delbos, 
146 CaL 734, 736-737 [81 P. 131] ; 12 Cal.Jur., "False Pre-
tenses, ' , § 13.) [2] In this state, these two offenses, ,with 
other larcenous crimes, have been consolidated into the single 
crime of theft (Pen. Code, § 484). but their elements have 
not been changed thereby. (People v. Myers, 206 Cal. 480. 
483-485 [275 P. 219] ; PeopZB v. Jones, 36 Cal.2d 373. 376-
377 [224 P.2d 353] ; People v. 8elk, 46 Cal.App.2d 140. 147 
[115 P.2d 607].) [3] The purpose of the consolidation was 
to remove the technicalities that existed in the pleading 
and proof of these crimes at common law. Indictments and 
informations charging the crime of "theft" can now simply 
allege an "unlawful taking." (Pen. Code, §§ 951, 952.) Juries 
need no longer be concerned with the technical differences 
between the several types of theft, and can return a general 
verdict of guilty if they find that an "unlawful taking" has 
been proved. (People v. Plum, 88 Cal.App. 575, 581-582 
[263 P. 862, 265 P. 322] ; PeopZB v. Myers, 206 Cal. 480, 484 
{275 P. 219] ; PeopZB v. Fewkes, 214 Cal. 142, 149 [4 P.2d 
538] ; see, also, PeopZB v. Palmer, 92 Cal.App. 323, 326 (268 
P.417].) [4] The elements of the several types of theft in-
cluded within section 484 have not been changed, however. 
and a judgment of conviction of theft, based OD a general 
verdict of guilty, can be sustained only if the evidence dis· 
closes the elements of one of the consolidated offenses. (People 
v. Nor Woods, 37 Ca1.2d 584, 586 [233 P.2d 897].) [0] In 
the present case, it is clear from the record that each of the 
prosecuting witnesses intended to pass both title and posses-
sion, and that the type of theft, if any, in each case, W88 that 
of obtaining property by false pretenses. [6] Defendant 
was not prejudiced by the instruction to the jurI relatins to 
I 
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larceny by trick and device. Indeed, he requested instruo-
tions relating to both larceny by trick and device and obtain-
ing property by false pretenses. Moreover, his defense was 
not based on distinctions between title and possession, but 
rather he contends that there was no unlawful taking of aJJ7 
IOrt. 
['1] To support a conviction of theft for obtaining prop-
, erty by false pretenses, it must be shown that the defendant 
made a false pretense or representation with intent to de-
fraud the owner of his property, and that the owner was in 
fact defrauded. [8] It is unnecessary to prove that the 
defendant benefited personally from the fraudulent acquisi-
tion. (People v. Jones, 36 Ca1.2d 373, 377, 881 [224 P.2d 
~ 8531.) [9] The false pretense or representation must have 
: materially influenced the owner to part with his property, but 
I the false pretense need not be the sole inducing cause. (People 
•..•• Chamberlain, 96 Cal.App.2d 178, 182 [214 P.2d 6001 and 
f.eases there cited.) [10] If the conviction rests primarily t 'on the testimony of a single witness that the false pretense 
:'was made, the making of the pretense must be corroborated. 
t(Pen. Code, § 1110.) 
The crime of obtaining property by false pretenses was 
unknown in the early common law (see Young v. The King, 
. 8 T.R. 98, 102 [1789]), and our statute, like those of most 
. American states, is directly traceable to 30 Geo. fi, chapter 
24, section 1 (22 Statutes-at-Large 114 [17571 ).1 In an early 
'Crown Case Reserved, Be~ v. Gooa:h4Zl, Russ. & Ry. 461 
':(1821), the defendant obtained a quantity of meat from a 
~ merchant by promising to pay at a future date. The jury 
"found that the promise was made without intention to per-
fform. The judges concluded, however, that the defendant'. 
~eonviction was erroneous because the pretense "was merely a 
E~: romise of future conduct, and common prudence and caution •... ' d have prevented any injury arising from it." (Russ. & 
... ' • at 463.) The correctness of this decision is questionable 
, ,~ light of the reasoning in an earlier decision of the King'. 
~Bench (Young v. The King, supra--not mentioned in Be~ •• 
:GoodhaZZ). By stating that the "promise of future conduct" 
;Was such that cc common prudenc'! and caution" could prevent 
f 'Thia statute provided, in pnrt, that • C all persons who knowingl,. and 
~a.tgned1y, b,. false pretence orpretenees, shall obtain from an,. persoll 
::w per801lB, mone,., goods, ,ures or merchandizes, with intent to cheat or 
i41efraud any person or pemon! of the same • • • shall be deemed oflenden 
~ law &ad the publick peace. ••• " (CI. P ... CocJe, .531.) 
) 
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any injury arising therefrom, the new o«ense was confused 
with the old common law "cheat." The decision also seems 
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.' and was so 
interpreted by two English writers on the law of crimes. 
(Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 183 
[3d ed., 1828]; Roscoe, Digest of the Law of Evidence iD 
Criminal Cases 418 [2d Amer. eel, 1840].) The opinion in 
Bez v. GoodkalZ, supra, was completely misinterpreted in the 
ease of Commonwealth v. Drew (1837), 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 
179, in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
declared (at 185), by way of dictum, that under the statute 
"naked lies" could not be regarded as "false pretences." On 
the basis of these two questionable decisions, Wharton formu-
lated the following generalization: ". . . the false pretense 
to be within the statute, must relate to a state of things averred 
to be at the time existing, and not to a state of things thue-
after to exist." (Wharton, American Criminal Law 542 [1st 
ed., 1846].) This generalization has been followed in the 
majority of American eases, almost all of which can be traced 
to reliance on Wharton or the two cases mentioned above. 
(Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697; PeopZs v. Karp, 
298 N.Y. 213 [81 N.E.2d 817); Steely v. Commonwealth. 171 
Ky. 58 [186 S.W. 883) ; but see Commonwealth v. Murphy, 
96 Ky. 28 [27 S.W. 859] ; State v. Pe,."." 171 Ind. 562, 564- . 
565 [86 N.E. 993]; PeopZs v. Orris, 52 Colo. 244 [121 P. 
1631 ; Sta,t, v. 81&etllin, 81 N.H. 121 [123 A. 233] ; StGle v. 
Knoff, 124 N.C. 814 [32 S.E. 798) ; Spriggs v. Craig, 36 N.D. 
160, 162 [161 N.W. 1007] ; State v. Bowd, 55 Utah 527, 533 
[188 P. 628} ; Prank v. State. 244 Wis. 658 [12 N.W.2d 9231 ; 
State v. Biggins, 148 Tenn. 609 [256 S.W. 875]; Common-
wealth v. Moore, 99 Pa. 570. 574: State v. Alick, 62 S.D .. 220 
[252 N.W. 644]; Wharton on Criminal Law, § 1439 (12th ed., 
1932) ; Clark and Marshall on Crimes. § 359 (5th ed., 1952); 
168 A.L.R. 835-837.) The rule has not been followed in all 
jurisdictions, however. Some courts have avoided the prob-
lems created by the rule by blurring the distinctions between 
larceny by trick and device and obtaining property by false 
pretenses. (See generally, Pearce. UTheft by Palse Promises," 
101 n.of Pa.L.Rev. 967: and see the development in the fol-
lThe word "pretence" in the middle of the eighteenth eentury was 
apparentl1 a 87Jlonym for the words '~purpose" and "intention." as 
wen as the words (more eommon toda1) "pretext" or "misrepresenta-
tion." Bee 8 The Oxford English Dietionary 1326, eol. 1 (1933). See, 
also, Webster'. New International Diction&r7 11159, coL 1 (2cl ed .. 
1H8). 
/ 
/ 
" 
t , 
r t Feb. 1954) PEOPLE v. A~m,F.Y 
ru C.2d 246: 267 P.2c1 2711 
261 
f 
r lowing New York cases: Loom18 v. People, 67 N.Y. 322 [23 
Am.Rep. 123]; Zink v. People, 77 N.Y. 114 [33 Am.Rep. 
589J; People v. Miller, 169 N.Y. 339, 349-355 [62 N.E. 418, 
t 88 Am.St.Rep. 546]; People v. Noblett, 244 N.Y. 355, 358-
l 865 [155 N.E. 670J ; People v. Karp, 75 N.Y.S.2d 169 [273 
t App.Div. 779J. However, the decision in People v. Karp, 
[ m-pra, holding that" [i)rrespective of the promissory nature 
~ of the representation .•. , it was larceny," was reversed on 
~ t appeal. The old distinctions were reestablished, and obtaining 
~ property by false promises was held not indictable. People 
t v. Karp, 298 N.Y. 213 [81 N.E.2d 817). A development 
~ similar to that in the New York cases took place in a series 
I of decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: see 
~. Rundell v. State, 90 Tex.Crim.Rep. 410 [235 S.W. 908); 
j Contreras v. State, 118 Tex.Crim. Rep. 626 [39 S.W.2d 62); 
t De Blanc v. State, 118 Tex.Crim.Rep. 628 [37 S.W.2d 1024) ; t Whitehead v. State, 148 Tex.Crim.Rep. 190 [185 S.W.2d 
~I"' ... ' 7.2. 5) ; cf. peOPle. v. Wetoert, 18 Cal.App.2d 457, 462464 [64 
'P.2d 169).} Other courts have repudiated the majority rule 
'. (State v. McMahon, 49 R.t. 107, 108 [140 A. 359) ; Common-
;;, tDealt1r. v. Morrison, 252 Mass. 116, 122 [147 N.E. 588] ; Com-
: monwealt1r. v. McKnight, 289 Mass. 530. 546-547 [195 N.E. 
~ 499}; Com11U)nwealth v. McHugh, 316 Mass. 15, 22 [54 N.E. r 2d 934]; Commonwealth v. Green, 326 Mass. 344, 348 [94 
; N.E.2d 260J [see Pearce, supra, 101 U.of Pa.L.Rev. 967, 983· 
1 .... 987) ; State v. Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 254-261 [87 N.E. ad 358J ; see, also, State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 244 [102 
N.E.2d 233)),· and it has been changed by legislative en-
~ actment (Neb.Rev.Stat., ch. 28, § 28-1207 [Cum.Supp. 1947), 
~ by drawing an analogy to the civil action for deceit (State v. 
tNic1r.o18, 1 Del.Crim.Rep. (Houston) 114, 115; State v. Me-
I·Jlalum, m-pra, 49 R.I. 107, 108), and by construing a promise 
' .. a representation of the "ability" or "intent" of the 
promisor to perform (People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 333 [193 
N.E. 150] ; Smith v. Fontana, 48 F.Supp. 55,59-60; Hameyer 
•• State, 148 Neb. 798, 801 [29 N.W.2d 458J; T1r.e Queen v. 
'Gordon (1889), L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 354, 359, 360; Rex v. Bancroft 
(1909), 3 Cr.App.Cas. 16, 21; Rex v. Alexandra, 26 Crim. 
t 'The majoritJ rule was also rejected b7 the United States Supreme 
fCourt in the construction of the federal mail fraud statute, 17 6tata. i-... 183 ... ,323. See DurZcJtId Y. United Statu, 161 U.S. 306, 313 [16 tI.Ct. 1J08, 40 L.Ed. 709]. On the basis of the Durland case, the statute was amended to include apeei1leall1 falBe promisee. 85 Stata. 1130, 18 U.S.o. ~U (1946). See Pearce ,.".., 101 U.ol Pa.L.B.v. H7, 878·8SU. 
) 
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App.R. 116 (1937); ct. Re:e v. Asferley, 7 Car.& P. 191. 173 
Eng.Rep. 84 (1835». 
In California, the precedents are conflicting. Early deci-
sions of the District Courts of Appeal follow the general 
rule as originally formulated by Wharton (People v. Green, 
22 Cal.App. 45, 48 [133 P. 334]; People v. Kahler, 26 Cal. 
App. 449, 452[147 P. 228) ; People v. Beese, 136 Cal.App. 
657, 663-665 [29 P.2d 450] ; People v. Downing, 14 Cal.App. 
2d 392,395 [58 P.2d 657]; People v. Jackson, 24 Cal.App.2d 
182, 203-204 [74 P.2d 1085] ; People v. Daniels, 25 Cal.App. 
2d 64, 72 [76 P.2d 556] ; see, also, People v. Walker, 76 Cal. 
App. 192, 205 [244 P. 94]; but see People v. Morphy, 100 
Cal. 84 [34 P. 623]), but more recently it has been held 
(and the holdings were approved by this eourt in People v. 
Jones, 36 Cal.2d 373, 377 [224 P.2d 353]) that a promise 
made without intention to perform is a misrepresentation 
of a state of mind, and thus a misrepresentation of existing 
faet, and is a false pretense within the meaning of section 
484 of the Penal Code. (Peop~ v. AmBl, 61. Cal.App.2d 
522, 531-532 [143 P.2d 92]; People v. Gordon, 71 Cal.App. 
2d 606, 624-625 [163 P.2d 110]; People v. Ohamberlain. 96 
Ca1.App.2d 178, 182 [214 P.2d 600]; People v. Da'lJ'i8, 112 
Cal;App.2d 286, 289, 298-300 [246 P.2d 160]; People v. 
Frankfort, 114 Cal.App.2d 680, 698 [251 P.2d 401]; see, also, 
Peop~ v. Bratfen, 137 Ca1.App. 658 [31 P.2d 210]: People 
v. Mason, 86 Cal.App.2d 445, 449-450 [195 P.2d 60]; People v. 
Staver, 115 Cal.App.2d 711, 716-720 [252 P.2d 700) ; People 
v. Silva, 119 Cal.App.2d 863 [260 P.2d 251].) These deci-
sions, like those following the majority rule, were made with 
little explanation of the reasons for the rule. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia has, however, advanced 
the following reasons in defense of the majority rnle: "It is 
of course true that then, [at the time of the early English 
eases cited by Wharton, supra] as now, the intention to com-
mit eertain erimes was aseertained by looking backward from 
the act and finding that the aeeused intended to do what he 
did do. However, where, 88 here, the act complained of-
namely, failure to repay money or use it 88 speeifted at the 
time of borrowing-is 88 consonant with ordinary commercial 
default as with criminal conduet, the danger of applying this 
technique to prove the crime is quite apparent. Business 
affairs would be materially eneumbered by the ever present 
threat that the debtor might be subjeeted to criminal penalties 
if tlae prosecutor and j'Dr'7 were of the view that at the time 
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of borrowing he was mentally a cheat. The risk of prose. 
cuting one who is guilty of nothing more than a failure to 
pay his debts is a very rea) consideration ..•. 
"If we were to accept the government's position the way 
would be open for every victim of a bad bargain to resort 
to crimina) proceedings to even the score with a judgment 
proof adversary. No doubt in the development of our criminal 
law the zeal with which the innocent are protected has pro-
vided a measure of shelter for the guilty. However, we 
do not think it wise to increase the possibility of conviction 
by broadening the accepted theory of the weight to be at-
tached to the mental attitude of the accused." (Chaplin v. 
United States, 157 F.2d 697. 698-699: but see the dissenting 
opinion of Edgerton. J., at 699-701.) We do not find this 
. reasoning persuasive. [11] In this state, and in the mao 
jority of American states as well as in England, false promises 
can provide the foundation of a civil action for deceit. (Civ. 
Code, §§ 1572, subd. 4, 1710. subd. 4; see 125 A.L.R. 881. 
882.) In such actions something more than nonperformance is 
lequked to prove the defendant's intent not to perform his 
promise. (Newman v. Smith, 77 Cal. 22,26 [18 P. 791] : Berkey 
Y. Balm, 101 Cal.App.2d 62. 69 [224 P.2d 885], and cases there 
oited; Rest. Torts, § 530. com. c.) [12] Nor is proof of 
nonperformance alone sufficient in criminal prosecutions 
based on false promises. (See, for example, People v. Gordon, 
. Ivpt'a; People v. Chamberlam, supra; People v. Frank/MI, 
ivpra; People v. Davis. supra; Rez v. Kritz (1949), 1 K.B. 
) [13] In such prosecutions the People must, as in all 
--.• "'--"-_!- prosecutions, prove their case beyond a reasonable 
Any danger, through the instigation of criminal pro-
_~Il~ by disgruntled creditors, to those who have blame· 
encountered "commercial defaults" must, therefore, be 
pn:u.r\lA"'~U upon the idea that trial juries are incapable of 
:l'"~ilglllllg the evidence and understanding the instruction that 
must be convinced of the defendant's fraudulent intent 
:lIe'rollld a reasonable doubt, or that appellate courts will be 
JUI]~ll4n in discharging their duty to ascertain that there is 
RlDlcl~ent evidence to support a conviction. 
[14] The problem of proving intent when the false pre· 
is a false promise is no more difficult than when the 
pretense is a misrepresentation of existing fact, and 
intent not to perform a promise is regularly proved in 
actions for deceit. Specific intent is also an essential 
) 
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element of many crimes.· [115] Moreover, in cases of obtain-
ing property by false pretenses, it must be proved that any 
misrepresentations of fact alleged by the People were made 
knowingly and with intent to deceive. If such misrepresenta-
tions are made innocently or inadvertently, they can no more 
form the basis for a prosecution for obtaining property by 
false pretenses than can an innocent breach of contract. 
[18] Whether the pretense is a false promise or a misrepre-
sentation of fact, the defendant'. intent must be proved in 
both instances by something more than mere proof of non-
performance or actual falsity (ct. Uniled 81at" v. Ballard, 
322 U.S. 78 [64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148]), and the defend-
ant is entitled to have the jury instructed to that effect. 
U [T]he accepted theory of the weight to be attached to the 
mental attitude of the accused t, is, therefore, not "broad-
ened," but remains substantially the same. (Of. C'1uJpZin 'V) 
United 8tate., supra, 157 F.2d 697, 699.) 
[1'1] It has been contended that the express provision 
for obtaining property by false promises in section 182 of 
the Penal Codel indicates that the Legislature did not regard 
such promises as ,. false pretenses" within the meaning of 
sections 484 and 532 of the Penal Code. In support of this 
contention it is urged that if the obtaining of property by 
false promises with fraudulent intent not to perform such 
promises were regarded as a crime it was unnecessary to 
provide for such a crime in subdivision 4 of section 182. 
It is then concluded that since words of a statute cannot 
be regarded as superfluous, if a reasonable construction 
thereof will give etIect to them and preserve all other words 
of the statute, the provision in section 182 for obtaining 
property by false promises can be given effect only on the 
theory that the Legislature did not regard the obtaining of 
property by such promises as a crime and therefore as being 
'For uample. arson. burgla17, lameD,.. maliciotil miIchief, and robbe17. 
In proBeCutioDII for attempted crimes. or for auault with intent to com· 
mit marder, robbe17. rape, etc., the .pecitlc intent mutt alIo be proved. 
'Section 182: "U two or more persona conspire: 1. To commit an,. 
crime; 2. Falsel,. and maliciousl,. to indict another for aD1 crime.· or to 
procure auother to be charged or arrested for an,. crime; 8. Falsel1 to 
move or maintain any 8uit, action or proceeding: 4. To cheat or defraud 
an1 person of any propert1, b,. any mean. which are ill themselves 
criminal, or to obtain money or property b,. false pretel1lle. or by false 
promises with fraudulent intent not to perform nch promise.; 5. To 
commit an1 act illjurie1l8 to the public health. to public morals. or to 
pervert or obstruct jUlItice. or the due administration of the laws. The1 
are punishable as followl: • • ." 
) 
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covered by subdivision 1. This argument proves too much. 
Subdivisions 2 and 3 provide for conspiracies to commit acts 
that would amount to perjury or subornation of perjury. 
Subdivision 4 provides for conspiracies to cheat or defraud 
any person of his property "by any means which are in 
~ themselves criminal," and to obtain property by false pre-
tenses, a crime defined in sections 484 and 532 of the Penal 
Code. Subdivision 5 likewise includes acts that are criminal. 
Sint'e these provisions describe many acts that are undoubt-
edly crimes, and thus included in the broad language of 
, subdivision 1, they were probably added by the Legislature 
I: out of an abundance of caution to insure the carrying out 
1, of its purpose to include all such acts within the scope of 
J', the section. The same abundance of caution is evidenced 
in subdivision 4 by the inclusion of both "false pretenses" 
and .. false promises" even though the former includes the 
latter. The omission of a comma after "false pretenses" 
also indicates that the Legislature did not set the one off 
from the other as a separate class of crime but regarded 
them as the same kind of crime. 
If false promises were not false pretenses, the legally 
~. sophisticated, without fear of punishment, could perpetrate 
on the unwary fraudulent schemes like that divulged by 
t the record in this case and those described in People v. Davis, I .. supra, Peop16 Y. Gordon, supra, People v. Frankfort, supra, 
. and Peop16 Y. Chamberlain, supra. To hold that false prom-
ises are not false pretenses would sanction such schemes with-
out any corresponding benefit to the public order. [18] The 
inclusion of false promises within sections 484 and 532 of 
the Penal Code will not "materially encumber" business 
affairs:' [19] "Ordinary commercial defaults" will not be the 
subject of criminal prosecution, for the essence of the offense 
of obtaining property by false pretenses is (as it has always 
. been) the fraudulent intent of the defendant. This intent 
, must be proved by the prosecution; a showing of nonper-
. formance of a promise or falsity of a representation will 
not suffice. 
• All shown above, to obtain property by false promises haa been an 
mdictable offense in a number of states for many years. Our attention 
hal not been directed to a judgment of conviction in any of those states 
that u based on a transaction remotely resem bUng an "ordinary com· 
mercial default." One 8cholar reports that inquiries directed to the 
Better Business Bureaus in the lE'ading cities of those states reccived 
.. tireb' negative answers. The busine&s community does not seem to be 
. aware of an "ever present threat" of criminal prosecutions for breaeh 
el eoa&rac&. See Pearce, .upT4, 101 U.o1 Pa.L.Rev. 967, 1007. . \ 
) 
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In contending that the evidence is insufficient to support 
his conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses, de-
fendant argues that the testimony of Mrs. Russ and Mrs. 
Neal was not only contradicted, but was inconsistent and 
self-contradictory, and thus incapable of belief. [20] It 
was for the jury to sift the true from the false, to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given 
the testimony of an individual witness, even if it was incon-
sistent. (People v. White, 115 Cal.App.2d 828, 831 [253 
P.2d 108]; People v. Frankfor" 114 Cal.App.2d 680. 700 
[251 P.2d 401] ;PeopZe v. Moulton, 71 Cal.App.2d 195. 197 
[162 P.2d 317].) [21] Defendant points to Mrs. Russ' 
testimony that defendant told her that "they" owned the 
La Brea property and to her later testimony that the loan 
was made directly to defendant. that the corporation "was 
not brought into this at all," and that she relied on his, 
representation of ownership of the La Brea property. Mrs. 
Russ was 71 years of age at the time of trial. It is possible 
that the pronouns were interchanged owing to knowledge later 
acquired, a slip of the tongue, or to the fact that defendant 
and the corporation he represented had become one in her 
mind. These matters were for the jury to consider in deter. 
mining the weight to be given the testimony; they do not, 
as is contended, destroy the testimony. [22] The same holds 
true with respect to Mrs. Russ' refusal to admit her sig. 
nature to the letter acknowledging receipt of the note and 
trust deed from the corporation. It is apparent that this 
letter. typewritten on the stationery of Life's Estate, was 
not written by her. and that she refused to acknowledge the 
letter or her signature because the letter stated that she 
had received a note prior to the one whose receipt was 
acknowledged in the letter. After trial. a note dated Jan· 
uary 5, 1949, was produced, which is presumably the one 
to which reference was made. Even if there was such a 
note, it does not follow that Mrs. Russ received it or that 
she realized what the contents of the letter were when she 
signed it. Even if she received the note and returned it 
as indicated in the letter, and thereafter forgot or concealed 
this fact, the matter is not material to the main issue and 
goes merely to credibility. 
[23] In the case of Mrs. Neal, defendant contends that 
the gun episode completely negates reliance on therepresen-
tations, and that her testimony was so contradictory as to 
be iDherentq improbable. Mrs. Neal teitifled that abe had 
/ 
/ 
I :::,,1:: w len:!=::~::;: .. W be re'1~2: f the bonds not redeemable at a bank. This testimony reflects 
a strong inability to make up her mind. Mn. Neal took all 
her bonds to the bank in the first instance; thereafter she' 
allowed the proceeds of the bonds not then cashed to be sent 
to her at the La Brea address; and finally she endorsed the 
cheek but did not take possession of it. The jury could 
reasonably conclude that she intended to make a loan of the 
money represented by the check at that time, in reliance 
upon the representations previously made. Thereafter, the 
gun episode occurred. It accomplished no more than an 
exchange of promissory notes, giving iln outward appearance 
of regularity to the transaction. Defendant's contention 
that if any crime were proved in connection with his trans. 
actions with Mrs. Neal, it was extortion and not theft, must 
.. 'therefore be rejected. Defendant did not forcibly take Mrs. 
Neal's money in the gun episode. He had already acquired 
'it, and the crime of theft had already been committed. 
" < [94] The evidence justified the implied finding that the 
money had been acquired with felonious intent. The jury 
. 'could reasonably conclude that defendant was the true head 
of this organization, and had deliberately set out to acquire 
the life savings of his victims. one a woman nearing 70 and 
the other a woman of little education and rural background, 
and both with little or no. business experience. The women 
.. were won over by flattering offers of positions in the organi-
c 'zation and false promises of security for their loans, and 
" . thereafter held in line by importunate and then menacing 
supplications. The lure of an ambitious theater project was 
,. cheld before the eyes of each. a project that was never realized. 
: ; The evidence was sufficient to sustain the implied finding 
~ ,that defendant never intended to acquire or build such a 
',theater, and, indeed, the financial situation revealed by the 
(( evidence made the acquisition or building of such a theater 
! illusory. The money acquired was needed and used for the 
running expenses of the corporation within a short time of 
its receipt. 
;~ '. [25] Defendant also contends that the necessary proof 
. e of "corroborating circumstances" is lacking. It is the duty 
t. of the reviewing court to examine the evidence to determine 
t'whether the corroboration required by the statute has been 
fproved; the weight to be given such evidence is for the jury. 
'i-~.. [26] The testimony of Mrs. Russ was fully corroborated. 
The witness Farnsworth testified that defendant had told him 
~ . 
'-
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that the Sunset property belonged to defendant, and that 
Farnsworth had been sent to an architect for plans of a 
theater to be built thereon. It was also shown that Mrs. 
Russ was given a second trust deed on the Nichols Canyon 
property. Mrs. Russ testified that she had been promised 
a first mortgage on the La Brea property; the defense main-
tained throughout that the loan was to be unsecured. The 
giving of the trust deed was indicative of a prior promise to 
give security. The testimony of various witnesses and the 
opening of the escrow clearly corroborate Mrs. Neal's testi-
mony about defendant's promises to buy the EI Patio Theater. 
[27] In addition, the fact that a defendant bas made 
the same or a similar representation to another. although at 
a different time and place, is a corroborating circumstance. 
(People v. Jones, 36 Ca1.2d 373, 379 [224 P.2d 353] ; People 
v. Chait, 69 Cal.App.2d 503. 516 [159 P.2d 445] : People '(a 
McCabe, 60 Cal.App.2d 492, 497 (141 P.2d 54]; People v. 
La France, 28 Cal.App.2d 152, 156 [82 P.2d 465] ; People v. 
Fisher, 116 Cal.App. 243, 246 [2 P.2d 564] : People v. White-
side, 58 Cal.App. 33, 41 [208 P. 1321.) In the present 
case, essentially similar representations were made to each 
of the women. There is not only the similarity in express 
l'epresentations, but in basic approach. offers of employment, 
and repeated supplications. They may therefore corroborate 
each other. (People v . • Jones, supra.) 
The attorney general contends that additional corrobora-
tion may be found in the fact that defendant did not call 
Mrs. Wingrave, the president of the corporation, as a witness . 
.AB the record does not disclose that Mrs. Wingrave had any 
knowledge that would have thrown light on whether the 
representations had or had not been made, the failure to 
call her as a witness can have no bearing on this issue. 
It is also contended that defendant's failure to testify is 
corroborative. [28] A defendant's failure to take the stand 
"to deny or explain evidence presented against him, when 
it is in his power to do so, may be considered by the jury 
as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence. and as 
indicating that among the inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to the defendant are 
the more probable." (People v. Adamson, 27 Ca1.2d 478, 
489 [165 P.2d 3].) [29] But the failure to testify will 
not supply a lacuna in the prosecution's proof. (People v. 
ZofJcl, 35 Cal.App.2d 215. 221 (95 P.2d 1601: People V. 
Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 489-490 [165 P.2d 3]; Peo])"" v. 
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Sawaya, 46 Cal.App.2d 466, 471 [115 P.2d 1001]; People Y. 
Cox, 102 Cal.App.2d 285, 287 [227 P.2d 290].) The rule 
is analogous to that in civil cases where the failure to produce 
evidence on the part of the defendant may not be considered 
until 8 prima facie case has been made by the plaintiir. 
(Girvet. v. Boy's Market, Inc., 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 830 [208 
P.2d 6] ; Breland v. Traylor Eng. " Mfg. Co., 52 Cal.App.2d 
415,425-426 [126 P.2d 455].) [30] In criminal cases, after 
the prosecution has made a prima facie case, the failure of 
the defendant to testify is not affirmative evidence of any 
fact, and any inference that can, in the circumstance, be 
justly drawn therefrom is persuasive rather thllD probative, 
lending weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution. 
~, In the present case the corroborative evidence adduced by 
the State was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury. 
which could then consider defendant's failure to deny or 
explain that evidence in determining the weight it was to be 
given. 
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair hearing on 
his motion for a new trial and that the trial court abused 
its discretion in failing to grant a new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence. 
, [31] Despite the fact that 8 daily transcript of the trial 
! was available, three continuances of the hearing on the motion 
! for new trial were granted at the request of defendant's 
counsel. The hearing was then set for July 20th upon the 
\. definite understanding that the motion was to be heard and 
decided then. On that day counsel argued the motion at 
!: length and announced that other parts of the motion were i, in the process of preparation by defendant who needed time 
t to secure signatures to affidavits No details as to the con-
tents of the affidavits were furnished, nor did defendant's 
counsel state that defendant wished to argue. CoUDJI:>l indi-
cated that he would not argue the remaining part of the 
f motion. A continuance was granted upon the condition that 
/ there would be no further oral argument. Neither the State 
I., .... nor the defense objected to this ruling. It was not until 
Ii leveral more continuances had been granted. owing to the 
,
.•...•. late filing of affidavits and the need to prepare counteraffi-
davits, that the motion was submitted and decided. It was 
'. within the discretion of the trial court to refuse any con-l. tinuance on July 20th. (People v. Winthrop, 118 Cal. 85, 92 I [50~. 390]; People v. Mayes, 78 Cal.App.2d 282, 291-292 
270 PEOPL1!l t1. ASHL1!lY (42 C.2d 
[177 P.2d 590].) The granting of a continuance upon the 
conditions and under the circumstances indicated, was proper. 
When defendant's affidavit· was filed, the trial judge com-
mented upon the fact that documents were set forth three 
and four times therein, that it contained irrelevant statements, 
and that it was repetitious and argu1llentative. He commented 
that such an unnecessarily long (78 pages) affidavit tried 
not only the patience of the trial court, but that if it should 
go before an appellate court, "it would try their patience 
to the extent that it well deserves that saying of seeing how 
far it willlly up the stairs when you throw it." 
Defendant contends that the attitude of the trial court, as 
reflected by the denial of additiona] oral argument and its 
remarks, denied a fair and impartial hearing on the motion 
for new trial. [32] If the trial court misconceives or re-
fuses to do its duty with reference to a motion for anew' 
trial and denies reasonable opportunity for oral argument, 
a new trial must be granted. (People v. Sarazzawski, 27 
Ca1.2d 7, 15, 17-18 [161 P.2d 934].) The record shows, how-
ever, that despite his remarks, the trial judge carefully 
read and considered the affidavits presented and caUed for 
the originals of the documents mentioned therein. The affi-
davits filed by defendant were in effect the oral argument 
presented in written form. It is clear that a fair and im-
partial hearing on the motion was had. 
[33] The newly discovered evidence consisted of docu-
ments allegecJly withheld and suppressed by the district at-
torney and of affidavits relating to testimony that would show 
that Mrs. Neal had committed perjury. The documents were 
aUegedly among the files of the corporation seized by the 
district attorney and not returned until such time that they 
could not be found and presented during the trial. This 
charge is a serious one. If true, it tends to show a deliberate 
attempt to convict on perjured testimony with full knowledge 
of its falsity. The facts, however, refute the charge. 
An affidavit of a Miss Bartholomew, and an affidavit of 
defendant, averred that full access to the files of Life fS Estate 
had not been given; that Mr. McClure, an investigator in 
the district attorney's office. had refused full access to the 
illes. The truth of the averments therein was denied by 
eounteraffidavits of the assistant district attorney and of Mr. 
McClure. An unverified affidavit of Miss Bartholomew told 
of threats to her made by the assistant district attorney 
relatinl to her foregoing affidavit. 
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There was more, however, than the mere denial of the 
charges and the implications therein. The only document 
that was material and that would almost certainly have pro-
duced a different result had it been authentic was one that 
purported to be the receipt that Mrs Russ testified had been 
given her by defendant and later returned to him. This 
document. which bears the signature of Mrs. Russ. is singu-
larly complete; it states that an agreement had been reached 
between Mrs. Russ and the board of directors of Life's Estate. 
that the loan was to be unsecured. that the loan was to be 
used for "the purpose of paying on bills and other general 
expenses of Life's Estate, Ltd .• and or at it's sole option, 
for maintaining and or improving the leased property at 
1537 N. La Brea. which is leased from a Dr. Phillips, and or 
the property owned by the corporation at 7051 Sunset Boule-
vard, upon which an office and ballroom are now being con-
structed," and that Mrs. Russ was making the loan strictly 
upon her own investigation and reliance on the future possi-
bilities of the business. The document contradicts every 
incriminating item of Mrs. Russ' testimony. Mr. Clark 
Sellers, a handwriting expert, testified that the signature was 
that of Mrs. Russ and that in his opinion it was a carbon 
impression of an original signature in pencil. In an affidavit, 
Mrs. Russ averred that she had never seen the document. 
that she had signed for a package of chocolates sent by a 
person who did not enclose a card or make himself known. 
The manager of the apartment house in which Mrs. Russ 
lived stated in an affidavit that a messenger had come to 
deliver the package, but refused to accept the manager's 
signature for it. It thus appears that the document had 
not been in the tiles held by the district attorney, but was 
manufactured, and that the signature thereon was procured 
by stratagem. Another such document, purporting to be the 
agreement of Mrs. Neal to the cancellation of the escrow and 
mentioning that her loan was unsecured, was ftled with the 
appellate court almost a year after the ftles had been returned. 
That part of the document where Mrs. Neal's signature might 
have been, was torn off. The other matter presented as newly 
discovered evidence was cumulative, denied by counterafH. 
davits, and came from unreliable sources. The court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. 
Mrs. Neal's testimony at the preliminary hearing was read 
at the trial Mrs. Neal was in North Carolina at the time 
) 
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of trial, and was unable to come to this state. Section 686 
of the Penal Code provides that a defendant has the right 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him in the pres-
ence of the court but that the deposition of a witness may 
be read if he is dead, insane, or cannot be found within the 
state, and if the charge has been examined before a commit;. 
ting magistrate and the testimony taken down by question 
and answer in the presence of the defendant who has himself 
or through counsel cross-examined or had the opportunity to 
cross-examine. 
At the preliminary hearing, a cashier's check for $13,590 
payable to Mrs. Neal and endorsed by her was introduced 
in evidence. along with a bank deposit slip of the same date 
showing a deposit of the same amount to the account of Life's 
Estate. Mrs. Neal testified that she had endorsed. this check 
to defendant and had given it to him. At the trial, the 
People introduced a second cashier'. check of the same date 
and amount, payable to Life'. Estate and endorsed for deposit 
by defendant. It appears that Mrs. Neal endorsed the first 
cashier'. check back to the bank which then issued the second 
cashier's check payable to Life's Estate. Defendant contends 
that he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. 
Neal about the validity of her signature on the second cashier'. 
cheek and to impeach her testimony at the preliminary hear. 
ing. This contention is without merit. [34] The right of 
confrontation can be waived (People v. WaZlin, 34 Cal.2d 777, 
'l81 [215 P.2d 1]), and defendant did not object to the intro-
duction of the second cashier's cheek. Furthermore, the 
error in Mrs. Neal's testimony about the first cashier's check 
is apparent on the face of the second check. The issue was 
thus presented to the jury, and the trial court did not err 
in admitting the second cashier's check in eVidence. 
Defendant contends that the reading of Mrs. Neal'a testi-
mony at the trial deprived him of the right of eonfrontation 
in violation of the United States Constitution. Even if this 
right is guaranteed under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
as contended by defendant (see Snyder v. Mas8tJChuseti8, 291 
U.S. 97, 106 [54 S.Ct. 830, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575]), 
there is no merit in the contention. [35] "The substance 
of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner 
in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face-
to-face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examina-
tiou." (Jlatloll: 1'. United 81al", 156 U.S. 237, 244 [15 
.I 
) 
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S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409J.) Defendant had that advantage 
at the preliminary hearing. 
Although a count of criminal conspiracy was also in· 
volved at the preliminary hearing, that fact does not in· 
k -nilidate Mrs. Neal's testimony. Counsel examined the tran. 
r acript and eliminated testimony that was inadmissible at the f' trial. The admissibility of controverted parts of the testimony 
~ was passed upon by the trial court before it was read to 
I the jury. 
~: The claim of error is predicated upon the denial of a 
> motion to have the prosecution elect between the two counts 
charging defendant with grand theft from Mrs. Neal, and 
, between the two counts charging him with grand theft from 
, Mrs. Russ. It is contended that only one theft was com-
, mitted as to each of the prosecuting witnesses. [36] "Where 
" the proof in a given case is sufficient to show Cle existence 
, Of a fraudulent intent or purpose on the part of an accused 
" to obtain property from another by false or fraudulent repre· 
" aentations, the making of the first false representations which 
; moved or induced the person to whom they were made to 
• part with his property does not immune the defrauding per-
" son from punishment for subsequently obtaining from said 
, Person other property which was parted with under the in· 
: tluence of the fraudulent representations which were still 
'operating on the mind of the defrauded person at the time 
"he passed his property into the hands of said designing per-
'eon!' (People v. Babe, 202 Cal. 409, 413 [261 P. 303].) 
This rule has been consistently followed in this state. (People 
v. Scott, 112 Ca1.App.2d 350. 351 [246 P.2d 122] ; People v. 
Howel, 99 Cal.App.2d 808. 818 [222 P.2d 969J; People v. 
,Mile" 37 Cal.App.2d 373, 378-379 [99 P.2d 551] ; People v. 
EllisOfl, 26 Cal.App.2d 496. 498-499 [79 P.2d 732].) 
,[37] Defendant contends that he could not be charged 
With a prior felony conviction. He admitted conviction of 
eonspiracy, a felony, and the serving of a term therefor in 
;a. federal penitentiary. For the first time on appeal, it is 
iftvealed that the crime was a conspiracy to use the mails to 
I defraud, and it is contended that such a conviction is not 
ra prior conviction within our statutes. It is. (Pen. Code, 
f §§ 969b, 3024, 8ubd. (c).) The fact that the minimum term of 
flelltenee is thereby increased does not render the law unconsti-
~~-;tu, "tiODal. (People v. Dutton, 9 Ca1.2d 505, 507 [71 P.2d 218]; 
People v. Dunlop, 102 Cal.App.2d 314. 316·317 [227 P.2d 
~l] ; 25 Am.Jur., Habitual Criminals, §§ 3-8.) 
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Defendant contends that the trial judge deprived him of a 
fair trial by limiting cross-examination, acting as prosecutor, 
slyly hinting to the prosecutor how to lead a witness. We 
find no basis in the record for these conclusions. [38] ., It 
is not only the right but the duty of a trial judge to so 
supervise and regulate the course of a trial that the truth 
shall be revealed so far as it may be, within th~ established 
rules of evidence" (People v Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 46 [223 
P. 65): People v. Martmez. 38 Ca1.2d 556, 564 [241 P.2d 
2241. ) That duty was performed and the trial judge so 
conducted the trial as to fully safeguard defendant's rights. 
[39] Finally. defendant contends that the district attor-
ney was guilty of misconduct in bis argument to the jury, 
particularly when he said that Mrs Russ was "robbed" of 
the security of ber second trust deed at a later time. The 
jury was aware that no charge to that effect was' involved, 
and that the word was used in the ~olloquia1 rather than the 
legal sense. The jury was properly cautioned. 
The purported appeals from the verdicts are dismissed as 
nonappealable. The judgment and the order denying the 
motion for a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SCRA UER. J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in 
the judgment solely on the ground that the evidence estab-
lishes, with ample corroboration. the making by the defendant 
of false representations as to existing facts. On that evidence 
the convictions should be sustained pursuant to long accepted 
theories of law. 
It is unnecessary on the record to make of this rather simple 
case a vehicle for the revolutionary holding, contrary to the 
weight of authority in this state and elsewhere, that a promise 
to payor perform at a future date. if unfultilled, can become 
the basis for a criminal prosecution on the theory that it 
was a promise made without a present intention to perform 
it and that. therefore. whatever of value was received for 
the promise was property procured by a false representation. 
Accordingly. 1 dissent from an that portion of the opinion 
which discusses and pronounces upon the theories which in 
my view are extraneous to the proper disposition of any issue 
actually before us. 
The majority opinion strikes down a rule of law, relating 
to the character and competence of proof of crime, which 
) 
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has been almost universally respectedfoT 200 years-and 
the reasoning which has been advanced fOT the innovation 
is that creditors, grand jurors, and prosecutors must not 
be f'xpected to institute any criminal charges against inno-
cent people. and that even if they do the intelligence of 
trial jurors and the wisdom of appellate judges can be 
depended upon to right the wrong, hence the time honored 
rule may bE.' scrapped. The unreality of this Teasoning and 
the wisdom of the old rule become obvious on reflection. 
In a prosecution for obtaining property by the making of 
a false promise. knowingly and with intent to deceive, the 
matter to be proved, as to its criminality, is purely sub-
jective. It is not, like the specific intent in such a crime as 
burglary, a mere element of the crime; it is, in any significant 
sense, all of the crime. The proof will necessarily be of 
objective acts, entirely legal in themselves, from which in-
ferences as to the ultimate illegal subjective fact will be 
drawn. But, whereas in burglary the proof of the subjective 
element is normally as strong and reliable as the proof of 
any objective element, in this type of activity the proof of 
such vital element can almost never be l'eliable: it must in-
evitably (in the absence of confession 01' something tanta-
mount th('reto) depend on inferences drawn by creditors, 
prosecutors, jurors. and judges from facts and circumstances 
which by reason of their nature cannot possibly exclude 
innocence with any certainty, and which can point to guilt 
only when construed and interpreted by the creditol', prose-
cutor or trier of fact adversely to the person charged. Such 
inferences as proof of the alleged crime have long been recog-
~ nized as so unreliable that they have been excluqed from the 
~ category of acceptable proof. j" 
• As a basis for overturning the rule that proof of the mere ~:: making of a promise to perform in the future and of sub-
~ sequent failure to perform is not proof of a false pretense, 
~ the majority opinion first purportedly adheres to the rule A by stating that "proof of nonperformance alone [is not] 
t sufticient in criminal prosecutions based on false promises," 
i then argues that" Any danger. through the instigation of 
[ criminal proceedings by disgruntled creditors, to those who 
"lO: .' have blamelessly ~ncountered 'coI?mercial de~aul.ts' .. must, 
.'. therefore,be predlcated upon the Idea that tnal lUl'les are 
. incapable of weighing the evidence and understanding the 
.'. instruction that they must be convinced of the defendant's 
.'. fraudulent intent beyond a reasonable doubt, or that appel· 
) 
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late courts will be derelict in discharging their duty to ascer-
tain that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction." 
This doctrine. if universally applied. would eliminate all rules 
governing the quality and sufficiency of proof. The credence 
to be placed in the testimony of accomplices. or other com-
plaining witnesses. would be left entirely to the sagacity of 
jurors and the presumed omniscience of appellate judges. 
I am unwilling to accept as a premise the scholastic redaction 
of the majority that rules of proof may be set aside because 
appellate judges will always know when a jury has been 
misled and the proof is not sufficient. The most important 
function which courts have to perform in respect to criminal 
law is not to make easier the conviction of alleged miscreant§; 
it is the protection of the innocent against false conviction. 
The highest duty which this court has to perform in thE" 
cause of justice is to protect the individual person against 
the power of the state; the most grievous injury it can do 
to the people is to assist m building a superstate by coun-
tenancing encroachments on the rights of individuals and 
whittling away at the rules which protect them. 
The suggestion in the majority opinion that it is incon-
ceivable "that trial juries are incapable of weighing the 
evidence [impliedly, with omniscient accuracy however in-
conclusive it be] and understanding the instruction that they 
must be convinced of the defendant's fraudulent intent be-
yond a reasonable doubt, or that appellate courts will be 
derelict [less than omniscient] in discharging their duty" 
a1fords no substantial basis for striking down a rule of proof. 
The opinion naively continues: "If . misrepresentations 
are made innocently or inadvertently, they can no more form 
the basis for a prosecution for obtaining property by false 
pretenses than can an innocent breach of contract" I 
The tragic part of the above quoted philosophy is that 
the very declaration of it as a rule of law makes it false in 
fact. It becomes false in fact because when published as a 
rule of law it cuts the heart out of a pertinent safeguard 
which the accumulated wisdom of at least two centuries has 
found to be necessary to prevent the conviction of the innocent 
who have met with commercial misfortune. 
With the rule that the majority opinion now enunciates, 
no man, no matter how innocent his intention. can sign a 
promise to pay in the future, or to perform an act at a 
future date, without subjecting himself to the risk that at 
some later date others, in the light of differing perspectives, 
) 
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philosophies and subsequent events, may conclude that. after 
all, the accused should have known that at the future date 
he could not perform as he promised and if he-as a "reason· 
able" man from the point of view of the creditor. district 
attorney !VQ a grand or trial jury-should have known, then, 
it may be inferred, he did know. And if it can be inferred 
that he knew, then this court and other appellate courts will 
be bound to affirm a conviction. 
A trial by jury, under circumstances easily to be foreseen, 
would offer but hazardous protection in such a case. I have 
faith-great faith-in our jury system as now constituted. 
But I have developed that faith through seeing it operate 
under wise and time-tested regulations and limitations as 
to the essential characteristics of proof which do not unreal-
istically assume that any human-whether a district attorney 
or a grand juror or a trial juror or a judge or justice of a 
court-is beyond error. 
The far reaching and revolutionary ruling of the majority 
opinion made under the circumstances shown, indicates to 
me not so much a desire to enforce law as a fervor to declare 
new law; the criticized ruling is not necessary to an affirmance 
in this case. Defendant here did more than merely make 
a promise, with or without a present intention to perform, 
to pay his victims in the future and fail to perform that 
promise. There is evidence from which it could be found 
that Mrs. Russ was induced to deliver property to defendant 
through reliance in a material degree on his knowingly false 
representations that he owned the La Brea property, on which 
he would give her a first mortgage.1 whereas the property 
'Defendant was accused in two separate counts of feloniously taking 
.3,000 in money from Mrs. Russ on or about November 19. 1948, and of 
felouiously taking .4,200 in money from ber on or about December 4. 
1948. 
The People's evidence as to these counts sbows the fOllowing: On 
November 18, 1948, defendant told Mrs. Russ that be owned the Sunset 
and the La Brea property, asked ber if she had any cash, and when she 
replied that sbe had .3,000 stated that he would give her a first mortgage 
on the La Brea property if she would lend him the money. Later on 
the 18th defendant asked Mrs. Russ if she had any real or personal 
property and she told him that she had a first trust deed and a ehattel 
-mortgage. 
On November 19 defendant drove Mrs. Russ to the bank and. induced 
11)' and in reliance on the misrepresentations, she delivered .3,000 iD 
easb to him. 
Defendant thereafter repeated his misrepresentations as to the La Bl'ea 
property and his inquiries as to whether Mrs. Rusl owned any other 
property, and stated that in exchange for the first trust deed she could 
laave • first mortaaae on the La Brea propert7. Either" four or llve 
) 
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was in fact owned by Dr. Phillips, who had leased it to an 
officer and stockholder of Life's Estate and had not author-
ized its encumbrance. There is evidence from which it could 
be found that a material element in the inducement of Mrs. 
Neal to deliver property to defendant was his knowingly 
false representation that she would have good security for 
her loan because Life's Estate was worth half a million dol-
lars,2 whereas it was in fact in financial difficulty. These false 
representations as to existing matters of fact would support 
the conviction. It has been consistently beld in this state 
that even though there is but one misrepresentation, there 
are separate offenses of theft through false pretenses if prop-
erty is obtained on separate occasions, because the crime is, 
not eomplete until defendant obtains possession of the prop-
erty.· 
days" after the cash transaction, or on November 20, defendant again 
drove Mrs. Russ to the bank and she obtained and turned over to him 
the trnst deed and chattel mortgage. Defendant told her he would 
•• cash" these evidences of indebtedness. 
Shortly thereafter Mrs. Rusa sold her trailer for $1,580 and turned 
thia sum over to defendant, again in reliance on hill representations as 
to the La Brea property. 
Abou~ January 15. 1949, defendant sold the trust deed to a broker 
for $3.000. 
"Dcfendant was a('cused in two separate counte of feloniously taking 
from Mrs. Neal $13,590 on or about June 19. 1948, and $4,470 on or 
about Augupt 3. 1948. 
The People's evidence as to these counts shows the following: In 
March, 1948. defendant met Mrs. Neal and asked her whether she had any 
property. She told him that she had $17,500 in .. war bonds." He 
learned by further questioning that the bonds were in North Carolina. 
discussed with her the making of a loan. and induced her to have the 
bonds sent to her. 
After Mrs. Neal obtained possession ot the bonds she inquired as to 
security and defendant replied that thO! security would be •• good," that 
Life'. Estate was worth half a million dollars, that there was $125,000 
worth of equipment in the La Brea building alone, and •• a lot of other 
property." On June 19, 1948, the day after defendant made the last 
mentioned representations, he drove Mrs. Neal to a bank where she 
cashed $13,590 of the bonds and endorsed and delivered to defendant 
the check for that amount which she received from the bank. 
At defendant's instrnctions the remaining bonds. which could not be 
cashed directly by a bank, were mailed for cashing with directions that 
the cheek therefor be mailed to defendant. Defendant thereafter received 
a check dated August 2, payable to Mrs. Neal for $4,470. She endorsed 
this check OD August 3 and defendant cashed it OD August 4. 
"The situation here ill substantially similar to that in People ". Babe 
(1927), 202 Cal. 409, 417 r261 P. 303T, relied OD by the majority. 
There defendant was charged in three counts with obtaining from one 
person by false pretenses $1.250 on August 2. '4,000 on August 5, and a 
deed to real property of the valu'! ot '11.000 on August 15. Each sum 
was in payment for stock in a corporation whieh rlefl'nnant said would be. 
but which was Dot, theroafter ineorporated. The false representations 
) 
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The requirement of section 1110 of the Penal Code that 
the false pretenses, if proved by the testimony of only one 
witness, be corrobol'atcd is met by evidence of similar pre· 
tenses made to another. (People v. Whiteside (1922), 58 Cal. 
App. 33,41 [208 P. 132] ; People v. Munson (1931), 115 Cal. 
App. 694, 697 [2 P.2d 227); People v. McCabe (1943), 60 
Cal.App.2d 492,497 {141 P.2d 54].} 
Here the representations of existing facts made to each 
of the victims, Mrs. Russ and Mrs. Neal, were similar; they 
were misrepresentations as to the existing ownership of prop-
erty by defendant or Life's Estate which would constitute 
security for any loan they might make. The similarity of 
defendant's scheme in each case is shown also by the repre-
sentations as to the use to which any loan would be put. Even 
though the representations as to things to be done in the 
future are not suflicient in themselves to support a conviction, 
they constitute a part of the fraudulent scheme and their 
similarities furnish additional corroboration. The employe 
of the bank who arranged for the cashing of Mrs. Neal's 
bonds testified that when defendant and Mrs. Neal came to 
the bank they stated that the proceeds of the bonds were to 
were that certain assets had been acquired for and certain persona had 
agreed to act as omcera of the proposed company. Defendant contended 
that one crime had been split into three parts. It was beld, .. (p. n31 
Where the proof in a !riven ease is suJJicient to ahow the existence of • 
fraudulent intent or purpose on the part of an accused to obtain propert,. 
from another by false or fraudulent representationa, the making of the 
Arat false representations whieb moved or induced the person to whom 
they were made to part with his propert7 does not immune the defrauding 
person from punishment for subsequently obtaining from said person 
other propert,. whieb was parted with under the intluence of the fraudu-
lent representations whieb were still operating upon the mind ot the 
defrauded peraon at the time he passed his prope1't7 into the banda ot 
&aid designing person .••• [p. '14] rT]he erime is accomplished when 
u. accnaed receives into his possession propert,. which he bad planned to 
fraudulentl,. pin. 80 ill the instant ease, while a general intent to de-
fraud may have been formed ill the mind of the accused at the time of 
or before he eompleted the firat offense. the other crimes charged 'lVere 
completed as separate and distinct offenses on the da,.. that he unlawfully 
took p088easion of the prope1't7 described in the several counts of the 
indictment. ' , 
The theo1'7 ill false pretenses cases 18 somewhat similar to that ill em· 
beulement eases where each act of fraudulent appropriation of a portion 
of prope1't7 with whieb defendant is entrusted is a separate crime 
(Peop" v. BtGfttord (1940). 16 CaI.2d 247, 251 [105 P.2d 969]) rather 
than that ill larceny cases where the taking of prope1't7 on different 
occasiona and even from difrerent owners pursuant toa general plan is 
treated as a liIlrle offenae (PeopZtl.,. DilZOfl (1934),1 Cal.A.pp.2d 224, 229 
[a8 P.2d 418]). 
, 
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be used in a real estate transaction involving a theatre. Also 
one Farnsworth, an employe of Life's Estate who was not a 
victim, testified that defendant told him that defendant o-wned 
the Sunset property. 
Generally corroborative is the following evidence: Farns-
worth testified that after Mrs. Russ had delivered her property 
to defendant she asked him for repayment at a time sooner 
than defendant was willing to agree to; that defendant_ as 
well as Mrs. Russ, appeared to be excited: and that defendant 
said, "it will ruin me, and how am I going to raise the 
money." An investigator for the district attorney testified 
that he went to defendant's home and the offices of Life's 
Estate on April 17, 1950, and told defendant's wife and 
officers and employes of Life's Estate that he had a warrant 
for defendant's arrest; that on this occasion and on two 
other occasions when the investigator returned they did not 
disclose defendant's whereabouts; that after defendant was 
finally apprehended in Long Beach in August, 1950, he said 
that he had gone east in an attempt to raise funds, that he 
had known for some time that a warrant for his arrest had 
been issued, and that he had not yet surrendered because he 
wished to straighten out his affairs. Mrs. Shepard, a woman 
not shown to be a victim, testified that on April 15, 1950. 
she had a telephone conversation in which defendant told 
her that he was going out of the city for a few days to raise 
some money, that he would arrange that her money be re-
turned, and that "I can't talk any longer . . • I am being 
watched." 
The testimonies of Mrs. Russ and Mrs. Neal as to the cir-
cumstances under which. they turned over their properties 
to defendant and as to subsequent circumstances are in some 
respects confused. but the jury may well have concluded that 
this confusion, rather than casting doubt on the essential 
portions of ~heir testimonies as to the false representations. 
indicated an aspect of their characters which made defendant 
select them as victims. 
On the subject of the nature of the representation n~ces­
sary to constitute the crime (whether a "false promise" is 
a misrepresentation of past or existing fact), the jury were 
instructed as follows: 
"To constitute the crime of theft by obtaining money by 
false pretense, the false pretense used must be a fraudulent 
representation of an existing or past fact ••• 
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"A mere expression of opinion or a statement concerning 
the future is not such a fraudulent representation ... 
"You are instructed that if you find that the statements 
made by the defendant were true when made, that a sub-
sequent change in conditions, which made it impossible to 
carry out the statements as made would not make them a false 
representation . . . 
" [A] promise is the expression of the present intent and 
is a fact. Therefore if a promise is unconditionally made 
and is made without intention of performance, it is a fraud. 
The secret intention of a contracting party not to perform a 
promised act which induces contractees to execute their agree-
ment is an essential feature of his representation. Whether a 
promise made to effect a transaction by subverting the will 
and judgment of a promisee, was dishonest, is a matter for 
the jury to determine from all of the evidence in the case." 
The last quoted instruction is in accord with certain dicta 
in People v. Gordon (1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 606, 624 [163 
P.2d 110] [actually the false pretense upon which the con· 
viction depended was not a mere promise; it was a misrepre-
sentation as to the character and value of land and the stage 
of its development for oil production4 ], and People v. Mason 
(1948), 86 Cal.App.2d 445. 449 [195 P.2d 60) [here, likewise, 
the false pretense depended not on a mere promise; it was a 
misrepresentation as to existing facts pertinent to the value 
of oil stock, the drming project of the company, its financial 
status, and the purpose of the defendant in letting the victim 
•• get in because she was a friend of Enders"]. cited by this 
court in People v. Jones (1950), 36 Ca1.2d 373. 377 f224 
P.2d 353], for the proposition (also interjected by way of 
dictum and entirely unnecessary to the decision) that •• a 
promise, if unconditional and made without present intention 
of performance, will cO!lstitute actionable fraud." In the 
J ODt~S case the actual misrepresentations are stated by the 
court as follows: "It appears from the testimony ... that 
"The true ground ot the holding of the District Court of Appeal and 
the peculiar sense in which it nsed the word "promises" is evident 
from the following expression (p. 624 ot 71 Cal.App.2d).: II The' assur· 
ances' and 'guarnntees' of immediate profitable sales or leases tor the 
vendees were of the nature of promises. tf a promise is unconditional 
and is made witl.out intention of performance it is actionable fraud ... 
I: the jury determined that defendants knew or had good renson to be-
lieve that the acres they were selling were outside of the productive limits 
of an oil field OT that they had no belief that the land sold was under-
ll\in with oil in commercial quantities ... then they were warranted in 
findin, that defendant. had committed thett b1 falae pretense." 
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defendant induced their [the complaining witnesses'] ad-
vancements of money upon the following representations: That 
the business was 'a gold mine,' was 'making nothing but 
money,' and 'there wasn't a chance of losing'; that the equip-
ment of the firm 'was all paid for'; and that more money was 
needed to secure new equipment." All of such representa-
tions obviously related to alleged existing facts, and were 
false. There are similar wholly unnecessary expressions in 
People v. Ames (1943), 61 Cal.App.2d 522, 531-532 [143 
P.2rl 92] [the actual holding was that "Because a false state-
ment of a present fact is coupled with a false promise of a 
future act, it does not overcome the effect of the false pre-
tense concerning the present fact"], and People v. Chamber-
lain (1950), 96 Cal.App.2d 178, 182 [214 P.2d 600] [a posi. 
tive statement as to ownership of a horse]. All the cases cited 
in this connection are, of course, out of line with the tradi-
tional view that proof of a false promise does not establish 
the crime. They do not attempt to explain or disappro~l". 
but simply ignore, those many other California cases which 
hold in considered opinions that a false promise is not a false 
pretense upon which a conviction of theft can be based. 
The Weight of Authority 
The traditional view that the representation must be of 
a present or past fact, and that a mere promise to perform 
an act in the future will not support a comlction, is e::rpres;;.,.d 
in the following cases: People v. Wasservogle (1888). 7i Cal. 
173, 174 [19 P. 270]; People v. Green (1913), 22 Cal..App 
45, 48, 51 [133 P. 334] [conviction reversed because de-
fendant's statements which induced victim to part with prop-
er~y were promises, not misrepresentations of fact]; Peoplt 
v. Kahler (1915),26 Ca1.App. 449, 452 [147 P. 228] [same}; 
In re James (1920), 47 Ca1.App. 205, 206 [190 P. 466!; 
People v. Mace (1925), 71 Ca1.App. 10, 21 [234 P. 8411; 
People v. Walker (1926), 76 Cal.App. 192, 205 [244 P. 
94] : People v. Moore (1927), 82 Cal.App. 739, 746 [256 P. 
266] ; People v. White (1927), 85 Ca1.App. 241, 250 [2:i9 
P. 76] ; People v. Cale (1930), 106 Ca1.App.Supp. 7i7. 7~ 
[288 P. 430] [conviction reversed because representations were 
in form of promises] ; People v. Robinson (1930). 107 ("at. 
App. 211, 221 [290 P. 470] ; People v. Reese (1934), 136 Cal 
App. 657. 663 [29 P.2d 450] [conviction reversed because rep-
resent:<n:1s ,rere l1!'i to futnre usc to be mnc1c of money] : P,o. 
pIe v. Downing (1936),14 Cal.App.2d 392, 395 [58 P.2d 651j, 
PEOPLE V. ASHLEY 
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'8 petition for a rehearing was denie<1 March 17, 
. J., and S~hn:lrr, J., were of the opiuion that 
should be granted. 
, 
